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How European is European Identification? 
Extent and Structure of Continental Identification in Global 
Comparison Using SEM 
Jochen Roose
Freie Universität Berlin
Abstract
European identification has been previously explained by the selective gains brought by the European 
integration process, by personal transnational experiences and by the influence of political programs 
aiming at increasing levels of identification. All these explanations imply that identification with one’s 
continent would be specific in extent and distribution across the social structure in comparison to other 
continents. These implicit assumptions of the discussion are tested with a global comparison using 
International Social Service Programme (ISSP) data and a longitudinal analysis using Eurobarometer data. 
The results show that, firstly, the current extent of continental identification in Europe is not higher than 
in other continents. Secondly, they reveal that there has been no increase in European identification in 
recent decades and thirdly, group comparing structural equation modeling (SEM) shows, that distribution 
of continental identification is similar on all continents. Accordingly, explaining European identification 
with respect to policy output of the EU is questioned by the findings. European identification proves to 
be independent of European political integration. Conclusions for transnational identity research and the 
European integration process are discussed.
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1.  Introduction1
European identification, understood as closeness felt to Europe, is, by its very name and essence, European.2 
Accordingly, to ask for the Europeanness of European identification seems to make no sense. However, if we 
look at this topic from a different angle we are faced with an interesting research question: Is identification 
with one’s continent in Europe, in extent and socio-structural composition, different to that within other 
continents? The European Union (EU) with its unique regional integration process uniting the European 
nation states into a partly supranational political system can be expected to exert considerable influence 
on affective bonds to the European continent. Therefore, we would expect a European particularity of 
continental identification in a global comparison.
Though it may seem obvious that the closeness felt to Europe is influenced by the EU and the European 
integration process and although this idea is widely shared by researchers of European integration, my 
aim is to question the Europeaness of European identification.
The assumption that European integration influences identification is significant for theory building 
and policy-making alike. In the context of public opinion on the European Union and the acceptance of 
European integration, the emotional side of identification is hotly debated (see e.g. Bruter 2006; Fuchs et 
al. 2009; Karolewski/Kaina 2006; Kohli 2000; McLaren 2007; Nissen 2006; Roose 2007). As identification 
with the political community is an integral part of support for a political system (Easton 1975; see also 
Fuchs 1999, 2002), it has gained importance in research. However, this research has focused solely on 
Europeans. Explanations have often been linked to the European Union and the achievements and effects 
of its activities aimed at identity formation from which some parts of the population profit more than 
others. What we are lacking by and large is a global comparison and analysis of identification with one’s 
continent. Only a global comparison allows us to determine whether the patterns found in Europe are EU-
specific or whether we find levels of identification and influence structures that are similar throughout the 
world, thus implying that European identity explanations referring to the particularity of the EU cannot 
be substantiated.
This article addresses these questions with an analysis of identification with one’s continent in a global 
comparison. First, arguments are presented which suggest we should expect stronger continental 
identification in Europe and a specific pattern of socio-demographic influences on this identification 
among the population (2). After briefly introducing the data source (3), the first stage of the analysis 
describes the global distribution of identification with one’s continent (4). The second step refers to the 
temporal development of European identification (5). Thereby, we can determine whether the current 
1 The paper has benefited from comments by an anonymous reviewer and participants of the conference “The 
Transformative Power of Europe“, organized by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of 
Europe“, hosted at the Freie Universität Berlin. The KFG is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) 
and brings together research on the diffusion of ideas in the EU‘s internal and external relations. For further 
information please consult www.transformeurope.eu. 
2 European identification is a specific concept in the huge discussion on European identity (see below). It refers 
only to the personal feeling of attachment to a unit. Other strands in the debate on European identity refer to 
membership in the social unit Europe or particularities of Europe in comparison to other regions in the world 
(see Brubaker/Cooper 2000). Here, I focus solely on on identification without reference to the other currents of 
the discussion.
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level of identification, as indicated by the cross-sectional analysis, is the result of a “catch up” process 
or whether it reflects a stable situation. The last step of analysis compares the patterns of influence on 
continental identification in a global perspective. Hence, we can discover whether the arguments linking 
European identification to particular benefits and policy programs of the EU are plausible, or whether we 
find the same influences in other parts of the world that have no comparable political structure (6).
2.  Why People Identify with Europe - in Theory
To explain the extent of European identification research literature frequently refers to the influence of 
the EU or to influences directly related to the EU. These arguments try to explain why it is highly plausible 
to expect a higher level of continental identification in Europe compared to other continents and why the 
socio-demographic characteristics of people in Europe identifying with their continent should be specific 
to Europe as well.
Three main lines of argument can be found in the literature. One approach is based on the idea that 
people who gain from the EU tend to identify with Europe. European identification is regarded as an effect 
of profiting from the EU and its policies. The second approach is linked to personal experiences while 
meeting other Europeans and positive interactions that result in stronger European identification. Finally, 
there is the idea of European identification increasing with the spread of collective narrations and symbols 
in a process similar to that of nation building.
Through analysis of data from the Eurobarometer survey, conducted by the European Commission (see 
3), it has been shown time and again that people with higher education, better professional positions and 
higher income tend to show stronger attachment to Europe (Dubé/Magni Berton 2009; Duchesne/Frognier 
1995; Fligstein 2008: 138ff). A usual interpretation of these findings is that these people have increased 
individual opportunities due to European integration. They have the chance to meet and interact with 
other Europeans as they profit most from the open borders and are able to widen their activities to the 
whole of the area:
“the most privileged socioeconomic groups are the most European. Owners, managers, professionals, 
and other white collar workers are more likely to think of themselves as Europeans than are blue-collar 
workers or service workers. Educated people, regardless of occupation, are also more likely to see 
themselves as European, and young people are more likely to do so than older people, as are people 
with higher incomes. All these groups have opportunities to interact with people from other European 
countries” (Fligstein 2008: 145; see also e.g. Immerfall/Sobisch 1997: 34). 
The underlying mechanism can be twofold. The policies of the EU could result in specific advantages for 
these people, as they are able to profit from the opportunities of an open area for travelling and an open 
market. This would correspond to the utilitarian approach for attitudes on the EU (see e.g. Anderson/
Kaltenthaler 1996; Eichenberg/Dalton 2007; Gabel 1998).3 In a similar line of argument, but rather as an 
historical analogy to nation state formation, some authors contend that identification can be increased 
3 Mühler and Opp (Mühler/Opp 2006: 26) refer to the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991; Ajzen/Fishbein 
1980) and argue that identification should be stronger if people profit from the respective region.
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by strengthening the social policy of the EU (see e.g. Meyer 2004, 2007). The output of EU policies is 
supposed to strengthen the identification of people profiting from it. Again, the basis of this second 
argument is the concept that identification is enhanced by advantages resulting from EU policies and the 
idea that we should expect stronger identification among those who profit most from the EU. As these 
gains are dependent on the EU and its policies, we should expect that the described mechanisms only 
work in the EU and on other continents we should find weaker identification with the continent, with this 
identification being unrelated to, or at least to a lesser extent related to, the respective social strata.
Another interpretation of these findings refers to the experiences of transnationally active people. 
According to this interpretation, it is the frequent and positive experiences of people in a transnational 
space that lead them to hold a European identity. This is argued for border regions (Pickel 1999; see 
also Roose 2010: 205ff; Schmidberger 1997; Schmidt et al. 2003) where people can regularly and easily 
interact because border barriers have been removed. It has also been argued for people who are mobile 
in the EU and meet people from other countries (Fligstein 2008; Mau 2007; Mau et al. 2008). The contact 
hypothesis of Allport (1954) and the discussion on cosmopolitism (Hannerz 1990; Szerszynski/Urry 2002) 
are theoretical reference points. Again, because the measures of the EU to facilitate mobility within the 
Union are assumed to be influential we should expect higher levels of identification with one’s continent 
in Europe only, while similar influences to this extent are by and large absent in other continents.4
This interpretation refers to a wide array of measures which were taken by EU institutions to create and 
promote a European identity. The European Commission finances several exchange programs for young 
people in various positions, such as students, pupils, or young people in professional training. The people-
to-people projects in border regions or exchange programs for partner cities (INTERREG) are also targeted 
on furthering European identification by personal contact between Europeans.
A third approach focuses on European symbols and narrations (Cinnirella 1996: 270). From the processes 
of nation state formation and population integration, we have learned how important symbols and 
collective narrations are to identity formation (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1991; Hutchinson/Smith 1994; 
Smith 1991; Tilly 1975). As Gellner (1968: 168) asserts: “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to 
self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist.” This does not mean that the reference 
points of shared symbols, beliefs and historical events never existed, rather, it highlights that historical 
(and other) facts on their own do not create a community. They have to be interpreted and integrated 
into a narration, which of course neglects and forgets other facts, therefore resulting in the “invention of 
tradition”, as Hobsbawm (1983) famously phrased it.
Some of the initiatives taken by the younger nation states have been copied by the EU. For example, 
the EU has its own anthem in Beethoven’s setting of “Ode to Joy”, though usually played without the 
text. The 9th of May is Europe Day, commemorating Robert Schuman’s presentation of his plan in 1950 
4 Other regional systems like ASEAN or NAFTA do not facilitate cross border encounters to the extent that the EU 
does. Of course there are other border regions where a considerable share of people commutes and entertains 
regular contact. The US-Mexican border is a case in point, which has been subject to considerable research 
(Martinez 1998; Pries 1998; Pries 2007: 51ff). However, this takes place amidst much stricter regulations or 
illegally. Therefore, the effects should probably be less intense. Also, if the open borders of the EU did not make 
a difference at all for cross border encounters (which is unlikely), an explanation referring particularly to the EU 
would also be falsified, though in this unlikely case the cosmopolitism argument would still hold. 
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to form a European Community of Coal and Steel which was established soon after. In many European 
cities there are events and celebrations on this occasion. The European flag is the most widely known EU 
symbol (although it was originally the symbol of the Council of Europe).5 The EU motto “unity in diversity” 
belongs also to this category of collective symbols and narrations. However, writing a European history – 
in a similar vein to how nation states have done and still do – has proved to be quite difficult. A House of 
European History is planned and a building has been bought in Brussels to house this exhibition. But the 
steps towards such a collective European history seem to be slow and the most influential medium for 
disseminating a European interpretation of history – curricula in schools – is everywhere dominated by 
national interpretations (Kotte 2007; Langner 2009; Seidendorf 2006). In the UNESCO database “Memory 
of the World”, which is a collection of “valuable archive holdings and library collections worldwide”,6 we 
find several entries which would be suitable for a European collaboration, such as collections of European 
styles in architecture or the original transcript of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony (which includes Europe’s 
anthem ”Ode to Joy”). The use of these holdings as part of a collection on European cultural heritage 
would be possible, or in the latter case even imperative, but in the annotations to these entries references 
to Europe as a whole are by and large missing (Zingerle 2006).
We have found several arguments to expect European identification to be particularly European in 
extent and in relation to certain social strata. As there are benefits and new opportunities resulting from 
membership of the EU, as well as politically-initiated programs by the EU aimed at enhancing European 
identification, we should expect a higher level of continental identification among the population of 
EU member states compared to non-member states in Europe, as well as compared to other countries 
in the world and the respective continental identification found there. Additionally, we should expect 
individuals from specific social strata to identify more intensively with Europe, as it is the highly educated 
with better professional positions, who – according to common arguments – profit more from the internal 
market policy of the EU. The less educated with the lower professional status are more dependent on the 
nationally-dominated welfare state and are likely to fear a threat to their weaker position on the labor 
market. These mechanisms are again bound to EU policy of market integration which does not take place 
to a similar extent in other continents.7 Therefore, we should expect the composition of people identifying 
with Europe to be specific to EU member states and not to be found, or at least found to a lesser extent, 
in non-EU (or non-EFTA) states and in other continents.
5 The EU flag is known by 92 per cent of Europeans and 91 per cent are able to say that it is the symbol of the EU 
(Eurobarometer 65). 33 per cent of Europeans knew that the EU has an anthem although they were not asked 
what it is (Eurobarometer 64). More, i.e. 41 per cent of the Europeans, knew that there is a Europe Day, but again 
they were not tested on the actual date (Eurobarometer 62). 
6 Self-description on the Website of UNESCO‘s project “Memory of the World”.
7 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) integrates some European states de facto into the internal market 
without them being members of the EU. This applies for Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein.
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3.  Data
Research on European identification has concentrated on the Eurobarometer studies as a data source. The 
Eurobarometer (EB) is a survey regularly carried out by the European Commission in all member states 
(and for some time spans also in prospective member states). In each country roughly 1,000 interviews 
are carried out (with more in the United Kingdom and Germany and fewer in Luxembourg and Malta). The 
surveys began in 1970 and since 1976 they were conducted at least biannually. Besides regularly changing 
topics a number of questions have been repeatedly asked over time including the issue of European 
identification. As the wording of the questions has changed over time, a continuous trend is not perfectly 
available. However, some very insightful comparisons over time are possible. The obvious shortcoming of 
the EB for our research question is its restriction to EU member states and prospective member states.8 
Another data source includes a question on identification with one’s continent: the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP conducts surveys in many countries in the world. The study in 2003, 
with a focus on national identity, brings together respondents from 29 countries.9 The question most 
relevant to our research was: “How close do you feel to [continent]?” with the response options of “very 
close”, “close”, “not very close”, “not at all close”.10
Beyond this dependent variable, a number of independent variables about the respondents’ socio-
demographic situation are used. Gender and age are measured straight forwardly.  Professional status 
is operationalized by income and professional prestige. Income is measured as the log of income 
z-standardized for each country, thereby reflecting the respective income structure of each country. 
Professional prestige is measured by the prestige values according to Treiman (Ganzeboom/Treiman 1996), 
using the International Standard Classification of Occupations’ (ISCO-88) coding of occupations. Education 
has been measured as the years of full time schooling including university but not vocational training.11
4.  Continental Identification around the World
The first question appears to be straightforward to answer. To determine whether the extent of identification 
with one’s continent is higher among EU countries than outside the EU, we must look at the frequencies of 
respondents who felt “very close”, “close”, “not very close” and “not close at all” to their continent. Table 
1 presents the answers to this question per country and groups the countries according to continent and 
EU membership.
8 Though the data set is not suitable for the analysis here, it will later be used for analyzing the evolution of 
European identification (see 5).
9 For details on the study see: http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-study-overview/
national-identity/2003/; last access 3 November 2010.
10 The values for the codes are 1 “not close at all” to 4 “very close”, i.e. higher values stand for higher 
identification.
11 For convenience, occupational prestige, age, and years of education have been divided by 100.
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Table 1: Feeling close to continent (ISSP, in %)
Country Continent very close close not very 
close
not close 
at all
N
Austria Europe 29,5 41,5 25,4 3,6 992
Denmark Europe 18,2 35,8 34,9 11,2 1255
Finland Europe 7,4 32,2 47,1 13,2 1211
France Europe 20,4 34,0 29,1 16,5 1522
Germany (east) Europe 10,2 46,9 36,9 6,0 401
Germany (west) Europe 13,3 47,9 33,1 5,6 803
Great Britain Europe 4,5 22,7 41,2 31,6 813
Ireland Europe 10,8 33,7 38,6 16,9 1046
Portugal Europe 26,0 41,9 25,7 6,4 1542
Spain Europe 17,3 60,6 17,2 4,9 1192
Sweden Europe 14,2 34,5 41,8 9,4 1103
EU-15* 15,6 39,2 33,7 11,4
Czech Republic Europe 20,3 51,4 22,0 6,2 1204
Hungary Europe 63,6 30,2 5,2 1,1 1007
Latvia Europe 3,4 16,2 41,6 38,8 925
Poland Europe 19,5 43,5 32,3 4,7 1199
Slovak Republic Europe 17,8 51,7 21,2 9,3 1047
Slovenia Europe 21,2 45,5 23,6 9,7 1057
EU-NMS-10 (2004)* 24,3 39,8 24,3 11,6
Bulgaria Europe 32,4 40,1 17,7 9,8 950
EU-NMS-2 (2007) 32,4 40,1 17,7 9,8
Norway Europe 19,7 40,2 33,0 7,1 1322
Switzerland Europe 20,7 58,3 18,9 2,1 1031
EFTA (not EU)* 20,3 49,3 26,5 4,6
Russia (European part) Europe 2,9 8,3 30,8 58,1 2039
Europe (not EFTA) 2,9 8,3 30,8 58,1
Canada North America 19,2 44,0 27,2 9,6 1031
United States North America 27,1 38,4 27,5 7,0 1165
North America* 23,1 41,2 27,4 8,3
Chile South America 36,0 36,5 21,6 6,0 1467
Uruguay South America 22,3 32,2 34,5 11,0 1089
Venezuela South America 30,0 28,3 23,5 18,2 1162
South America* 29,4 32,3 26,5 11,7
Japan Asia 16,1 46,5 28,2 9,2 901
South Korea Asia 6,0 24,4 45,6 24,0 1286
Taiwan Asia 1,3 10,1 34,5 54,2 1827
Asia* 7,8 27,0 36,1 29,1
South Africa Africa 38,7 31,4 19,2 10,7 2357
Africa 38,7 31,4 19,2 10,7
 *All averages are unweighted means.
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The level of identification with Europe varies considerably amongst the old member states of the EU. 
Austria is at the top of the range with 30 per cent who feel “very close” to Europe and Great Britain is 
at the opposite end with only 5 per cent feeling “very close” to Europe. Taking the first two categories 
together (“very close” and “close”), Portugal scores even higher than Austria, while Britain remains with 
the smallest per cent. The mean of the countries belonging to the group of old EU-15 member states for 
feeling “very close” is 16 percent and for feeling “very close” or “close” 55 per cent.
Six countries belong to the Eastern accession group of 2004. At the time when the survey was carried out 
they were not yet members of the EU but the accession date was already fixed and prior to accession 
considerable financial transfers took place. The results for these countries cover an even wider range 
from 64 percent (Hungary) to 3 per cent (Latvia) feeling “very close” to Europe. The average of these 
countries for feeling “very close” is a considerable 24 per cent, which is even higher than the subjective 
identification amongst respondents from the old member states. As the people in the new member states 
begin to profit from EU transfers, such a result seems plausible, although the differences between the 
countries remain difficult to explain.12
In the two EFTA countries which are not members of the EU (but are part of the ISSP data-set) the average 
level of closeness felt to Europe is not lower than the level amongst the EU-15 countries. Every fifth 
person in these countries feels “very close” to Europe and another half of the population feels “close” to 
Europe. One might conclude from this comparison that the economic advantages, which are similar for EU 
members and EFTA members, are more influential than the identity building activities of the EU targeted 
only at EU member states. However, this interpretation seems to be too ambitious in light of the high 
variance amongst EU member states.
Feeling “close” to Europe is considerably less frequent in Russia, the only available European country 
which is neither part of EFTA nor the EU. Only 3 per cent feel “very close” to Europe and only another 8 
percent feel “close” to Europe. From this result we could conclude that economic advantages provided by 
the European free market (including by and large the EFTA countries) and the identity building activities of 
the EU have an effect. The Russians and their low identification with Europe are the crucial case in point. 
However, Russia is only one case having to carry all the load of evidence. As soon as we leave Europe and 
turn to the rest of the world, the picture changes completely.
The second highest level of continental identification is found in South Africa, where 39 per cent feel “very 
close” to Africa and another 31 per cent feel “close” to Africa. Also in South America identification with 
the continent is very high. In Chile, 36 per cent feel “very close” to South America and another 37 per 
cent feel “close” to their continent. The numbers for Venezuela are a bit lower (“very close”: 30 per cent, 
“close”: 28 per cent), but the share of people feeling “very close” in Venezuela is still higher than in any EU-
15 member state. In the EU, only Hungary, with its exceptionally high rate of 64 per cent of respondents 
feeling “very close” to Europe,13 shows stronger identification with its respective continent.
12 Díez Medrano (2003) shows in his in-depth study of attitudes on the EU and European identification how country-
specific the influences are and accordingly how difficult general explanations are to find.
13 A similar question has been asked around the same time in the EB. People were asked how attached they feel to 
the European Union (not Europe!) with the options being “very attached”, “fairly attached”, “not very attached” 
and “not at all attached”. In Hungary, the share of those who feel “very attached” to the European Union is by 
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It is also instructive to take a look at those countries where closeness to the continent is seldom felt. At 
the very bottom of the scale we find the Taiwanese and the Russians. In both countries more than half of 
the population feels “not at all close” to its respective continent. Other countries in which more than one 
fifth of respondents do “not feel at all close” to his or her continent are Israel (among the Jewish as well as 
the Arabs) and South Korea, but also some countries of the EU. 32 per cent of the British do “not at all feel 
close” to Europe and even 39 per cent of Latvians say that they do “not at all feel close” to Europe.
Taking these findings together we can see that it is no longer valid to assume that Europeans and 
especially the people within the EU identify more strongly with Europe than people elsewhere do with 
their respective continent.
Before we discard any influence from the EU in terms of individual gains, easy opportunities for international 
encounters or identity formation activities, we shall discuss a second test of this hypothesis to see change 
over time.
5.  European Identification over Time
There is a possible way to explain why the EU might have an (increasing) effect on identification with 
Europe and yet we still might not see the expected differences in a global comparison. We could assume 
that the EU already has increased European identification amongst those people living in Europe and 
that their level of identification as found in the 2003 survey is already the result of this process. This 
would be plausible if the continental identification in Europe was extremely low in a global comparison in 
earlier decades. In fact, such an assumption might be reasonable when we take into account the bloody 
wars in Europe in the first half of the 20th century and even in the centuries before. Obviously Europe 
was not the only continent involved in bitter wars with huge death tolls. Still, the world wars can be 
regarded as exceptional in their brutality and involvement of civilian populations so that a negative effect 
on continental identification is at the very least a possibility.
We do not have data on continental identification for the years when the forerunner of the EU, the 
European Coal and Steel Community, was founded in the early 1950s. However, one should keep in mind 
that neither the economic advantages of a free market nor the activities of the EU in furthering European 
identification had become significant for the ordinary population at that time. The single market project 
gained momentum with the Cassis de Dijon ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1979 and the 
intensified activity of the European Commission following the White Paper on the internal market in 1985 
(see e.g. Peterson/Bomberg 1999: 60ff). Exchange programs such as ERASMUS or INTERREG were initiated 
in the 1990s. The European anthem, the Europe Day and the European flag were chosen in 1985 and 
1986 respectively, with the Motto only following in the year 2000. Likewise, other activities which could 
be regarded as part of this identity formation by EU institutions mostly began in the 1990s and thereafter. 
So the relevant time span in which the EU’s activities should have the most influence on identification – 
far the largest (53.6 per cent). Ranking second is Bulgaria with 28.5 per cent. Though this question is not exactly 
the same as in the ISSP, in which not the EU but Europe is the reference object, the answer patterns are similar 
enough to validate the reported exceptional finding for Hungary.
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according to theories – is in the 1980s at the earliest, but mainly we should focus on the following two 
decades.
From the Eurobarometer we have data on the evolution of European identification. Different versions of 
asking about something like a European identification have been used, but the results concerning the time 
trend are very constant.
In the 1990s a question dominated which asked the respondent to weigh his/her belonging to the 
respective nation state against his/her belonging to Europe.14 Figure 1 shows the development over time 
of answers to this question.
Figure 1: Self Concept: European vs. National 1992 to 2004
14 The wording is: “In the near future, will you see yourself as…” with the options “Nationality only”, “Nationality 
and European”, “European and Nationality”, “European only”. There has been much criticism concerning this 
question, but one should keep in mind that a considerable change in the extent of identification with Europe 
should also have some influence on the response patterns for this question.
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In the years 1992 to 2004 there is no obvious trend indicating an increase in European identification. 
Around 40 per cent of the EU population, increasing slightly between 1996 and 2000, regard themselves 
as only their nationality. Most of the others see themselves as belonging to their Nationality in the first 
place and Europe thereafter, while only few regard themselves as European and National, or European 
only. An obvious rise in European identification, indicating influence by the individual gains available from 
the internal market or by the other attempts to increase European identification, cannot be found.
The result remains identical when we look at another version of the question. In some studies of the EB 
respondents were asked how often they feel not only national but also European, with the options “often”, 
“seldom” or “never”. Changes in response between 1982 and 2005 for the ten states which were already 
members in 1982 are moderate and again with no clear trend. In 1982, 17 per cent of the respondents 
said that they often feel European; in 1992 this share fell to 13 per cent. By 2005 the number rose back up 
to 19 percent. In the other categories (“seldom” and “never”) the changes are just as small. This question, 
then, like the other, but covering a longer time span, does not indicate a considerable rise of European 
identification since the early 1980s. Rather, European identification, as far as it can be measured from 
these questions, has remained by and large constant.15 Therefore, we can rule out the possibility that the 
current extent of European identification is the result of a considerable increase after a very low initial 
level. Instead, we can conclude that the extent of European identification in the EU is not peculiar to 
Europe but within the usual range of continental identification found around the world.
6.  Socio-Structural Differences in Continental Identification
TBesides differences between the extents of individual identification, we also should expect specific 
variation in continental identification according to socio-demographic characteristics. As argued above 
(2), within the EU the highly educated with higher professional status and income should identify with 
Europe to a larger extent than respondents from lower social strata, as the former profit most from the 
integration process, whilst the latter are more likely to be threatened by increased competition in their 
respective labor market segment. These influences should be irrelevant outside the EU.
We again turn to the abovementioned ISSP data-set of 2003 but now compare the influence of socio-
demographic variables on the strength of continental identification. Path models provide a powerful tool 
for the comparison of groups and the analysis of causal structures for different samples.16 
Figure 2 presents a fairly simple path model. The influence of occupational prestige, income, age, 
education and gender on an individual’s identification with their respective continent is modeled. Some 
of the variables can be expected to be highly correlated. Occupation prestige, education and income are 
15 See also the analysis by Duchesne and Frognier (Duchesne/Frognier 1995) on this matter, as well as Fligstein 
(2008: 141f).
16 Due to unclear identification of the respective continent or due to missing data, the following countries had to 
be excluded from the analysis: Venezuela, Taiwan, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile, Israel, Australia and the 
Philippines. Germany is analyzed separately for East and West.
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obviously closely connected. Additionally, age can be expected to have an influence on income and, due 
to the expansion of education, also on the educational level.17
Figure 2: Path Analysis for the Closeness Felt to One’s Continent: Theoretical Model
What should we expect from the group comparison when we assume a specific influence of socio-
demographic variables on continental identification in the EU and a different pattern outside the EU? First, 
we should expect that we are unable to fit a model with fixed path coefficients for all groups.18 Secondly, 
we should expect that a model fitted to the EU member states would not fit for the other countries.
Interestingly though, it is possible to fit a model for all countries with fixed path coefficients (see figure 
3). The model fit is satisfying, which is a surprising result considering that we have a very heterogeneous 
sample of countries being analyzed.19
17 These correlations can be found in the double arrows connecting the error terms of the respective variables. The 
straight arrows describe the causal influence modeled according to theoretical reasoning.
18 For those unfamiliar with path analysis, this means that the coefficients of causal influence (equal to regression 
coefficients in regression analysis) are equal for all groups, i.e. country samples. 
19 The global fit measures are: RMR=0.021, GFI =0.982 (usual threshold is >0.95), AGFI=0.960 (>0.90), CFI=0.942 
(>0.90), NFI=0.932 (>0.90), RMSEA=0.013 (<0.10). For recommended thresholds of model fit see e.g. Schmidt/
Davidov (2006: 41) and Hu/Bentler (1995: 95).
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Figure 3: : Path Analysis for Closeness Felt to One’s Continent: all countries with fixed effects
The coefficients in the model confirm that people with better professional positions, higher income and 
better education tend to identify more with their continent. Additionally, older people tend to identify 
more with their continent.20 According to the coefficients men tend to identify less with their continent. 
However, this finding is not significant at the 0.1 % level. As the number of valid observations for the 
model amounts to roughly N=25,000, we should have doubts about the validity of a coefficient which is 
not significant at this level. Therefore, it is quite likely that there is no difference influenced by a person’s 
gender. These findings are by no means new in research on European identification (see e.g. Duchesne/
Frognier 1995; Fligstein 2008; Kohli 2002). What is remarkable though is that the influences are identical 
in all the countries around the world.
To verify this finding, we can make an additional test. The sample of available countries we have used is 
dominated by EFTA members. In the overall sample analyzed in this path model, there are only 8 non-EFTA 
countries and 19 EFTA member countries (with 20 samples, as Germany is analyzed separately for East and 
West). To verify our results with a stricter test we can determine whether the coefficients in the model are 
also valid for the non-EFTA countries when analyzed on their own.
20 All these coefficients are significant on the 0.1 % level (not reported in figure 3).
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Table 1: Feeling close to continent (ISSP, in %)
Model for 
EU-27 countries 
Model for 
EU-15 countries
Model for 
non-EFTA countries
RMR 0.024 0.023 0.061
GFI 0.982 0.985 0.974
AGFI 0.963 0.968 0.946
CFI 0.942 0.950 0.919
NFI 0.929 0.938 0.909
RMSEA 0.016 0.019 0.030
Table 2 compares the Goodness of Fit measures for path models between the countries belonging to the 
older EU-15 member states, the countries belonging to the EU-27 member states and the available non-
EFTA countries, where the coefficients were fixed to the respective value calculated for the whole sample 
above. The Goodness of Fit measures for the EU-27 countries indicate an acceptable quality of the model 
which is similar to the overall model. This is no surprise because these countries make up the largest share 
in the sample analyzed. The model fit for the countries from the older EU members (EU-15) is about as 
good as the fit for the current EU members (EU-27). However, the Goodness of Fit measures for the model 
calculated for the non-EFTA countries are very good as well and are even slightly better than the Goodness 
of Fit measures for the EU-27 and the EU-15 countries. So the results for the theoretical model (see Figure 
2) in the six non-EFTA countries (which are Canada, Japan, Russia, South Korea, Uruguay and the USA) are 
very similar to the results for older and newer EU member states.
The path analysis has shown quite clearly that the influence of the socio-demographic variables – prestige 
of occupation, income, age, education and gender – in EU countries is almost identical to that found in 
the non-EU countries. This even holds true if we allow some time for the attempts by the EU to form a 
European identity to take effect, as the comparison with the older EU-15 member states shows.
7.  Conclusion
The EU is unique within the world. In no other continent do we find such an endeavor of uniting established 
nation states in a new political system. This political and economic process should be accompanied by a 
change in attitudes and self-identity of European citizens. This assumption applies not only as a theoretical 
expectation but as a normative statement according to the paradigm of political culture.
There has been ample research on European identity and its development within the EU. However, a 
comparison between the continental identification of Europeans and people in other parts of the world 
with their respective continents had not been previously carried out. This article has shown that research 
focused solely on Europe can be quite misleading.
Coefficients are fixed to the values of the reference model for all country samples; RMR - Root Mean Square 
Residual; GFI - Goodness of Fit Index (usual threshold >0.95); AGFI - Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (>0.90); CFI - 
Comparative Fit Index (>0.90); NFI - Normed Fit Index (>0.90); RMSEA - Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(<0.10).
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In theory, it is very plausible that the level and structure of European identification is specific to Europe 
and the EU. The EU institutions have taken several measures aiming at identity formation by publicly 
appraising cultural similarities and collective cultural European roots, as well as establishing common 
European symbols. Specific gains from increased EU integration for the population as a whole, and even 
more so for the highly educated with better jobs, are also supposed to be influential for identity formation. 
Consideration of these descriptions and assumptions would lead us to expect the EU population to identify 
more strongly with Europe than citizens elsewhere do with their respective continent.
This assumption has turned out to be wrong. The data available has shown that the level of continental 
identification is similar on all continents. The differences between countries are sometimes very great 
and much larger than the differences between continents. On average, we do not find a higher level of 
continental identification in Europe compared to other continents and the countries with the highest 
proportions of people identifying strongly with their continent, besides Hungary, are South Africa, Chile 
and Venezuela, i.e. outside of the EU.
In addition, there are no specific patterns of socio-economic influences on continental identification in 
Europe compared to other continents. All around the world people with higher income, higher age, higher 
occupational prestige and – with less influence – higher education, tend to feel closer to their respective 
continent. A special situation in Europe cannot be found.
The results presented here offer a considerable challenge to the usual explanations for identification 
with Europe. The approach of explaining attitudes towards Europe, including identification, by benefits 
resulting from the European integration process is at odds with the results found here. If selective gains are 
influential we should expect a higher level of identification with one’s continent in Europe and we should 
find different patterns of influences on identification (and accordingly different path analysis models) 
for EU countries compared to others. This is not the case. Possibly, it is rather a general cosmopolitan 
perspective, learned among higher social strata, which widens the view to the continent as a whole (cf. 
Beck/Grande 2004; Hannerz 1990; Held 2002; Mau 2006; Szerszynski/Urry 2002). The idea of cognitive 
mobilization, presented decades ago by Inglehart (1970) and Deutsch (1961), is more in accordance with 
our findings.
There are some lessons to be learned. Firstly, attempts to explain identification with Europe should 
refrain from referring to particular gains and losses arising from the unification process. According to the 
presented results, identification with the European continent is not dependent on membership of the EU 
but in fact it underlies mechanisms which are of general impact all around the world.
Secondly, a general puzzle of attitude research with respect to the EU is solved. As identification with Europe 
is not related to membership of the EU, European identification should be regarded as an independent 
variable explaining other kinds of attitudes towards the EU. It is not the evaluation of the EU which results 
in a European identification but it is the identification which has an influence over the evaluation.
Thirdly, for the European integration process and elite strategies to support this process, these findings 
bare fundamental consequences. European identification, with its influence on support for EU integration 
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and EU policies (see e.g. Fuchs et al. 2009; Roose 2007), seems to be unresponsive to selective gains. The 
effort to bind citizens emotionally to Europe by successful policy output seems to be futile. Ever more eager 
projects of providing citizens with even more supposed benefits from the EU, such as a common European 
welfare state, will probably not build up the collective identification needed but will instead fail because 
of too little European identification. In addition, the activities to enhance identification by introducing 
common symbols of unity and a common historical narration have been without considerable effect so far. 
The path of community building, which the nation states went down so successfully, seems to have not 
really begun in the EU. Accordingly, the EU should not count too much on increasing identification above 
the current level through emotionally founded support.
Finally, researchers of European identity and, indeed, other European issues, should not forget to widen 
their view beyond the EU. Some trends which seem specific to the EU experience may turn out to be part 
of global phenomena unrelated to the unique European integration process.
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